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Contemporary Conflicts in Africa: implications for development studies/policies 
 
Timothy M Shaw1 
 
“Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for over half of all the armed conflicts taking place     
around the world in 1999, and some of the most costly in terms of human life. 
Three-quarters of the countries in the region are engaged in armed conflict, or 
confronted by a significant threat from armed groups with a mixture of political 
and economic motives” (IISS 1999b: 244) 
 
The apparent resilience of conflict in Africa has begun to generate an analysis, 
which is novel in its approach but disturbing in terms of implications. The political 
economy of violence perspective (Reno 1998 & 2000a & b, Smillie 2000) suggests 
that at least some of these resilient wars are more about economic 
resources/survival than, say, ethnicity, ideology, region, religion etc. This paper 
seeks to begin to identify some of the problematic implications of such a 
perspective on development studies/policies as for, say, security studies/policies, as 
indicated in the final section. In particular, I raise a series of questions about a 
problematic set of implications arising from this emerging PE of violence genre for 
all three established actor types in the ‘governance ‘ nexus; i.e. not just for states 
but also for private sectors & civil societies. Clearly, the African state is in 
transition given two decades of neo-liberal conditionalities both formal & informal; 
hence the relative rise of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) & multi-national 
corporations (MNCs). But both of the latter are themselves beginning to confront 
troubling questions about their own attitudes to & practices in such ubiquitous 
conflict situations (Bryans 1999, Spearin 2000).  
 
Furthermore, the diminished African state cannot any longer afford much of a 
regular military establishment if it ever could. However, at least until 1990, the 
logic of the Cold War helped to keep both regimes & armies in business. As 
military budgets decline so statutory forces have had to begin to learn to fend for 
themselves; hence the apparent willingness of some African governments to ‘sell’ 
statutory forces to UN & other PKOs, even if some/all of the ‘off-budget’ proceed 
go into private pockets rather than the national exchequer.  Moreover, men in 
uniform have learned to take them off after hours to pursue private gain as bandits, 
pirates etc. And demobilised soldiers tend to have few other life skills than using 
                                                 
1 Timothy M. Shaw is currently visiting Professor at Research Center on Development and 
International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark. Professor at Dalhousie University in 
Halifax, Canada and affiliated with Mbarara and Stellenbosch Universities in Uganda and 
Johannesburg, South Africa, respectively.  
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their weapons to secure at least their own Basic Human Needs (BHNs). As the 
militaries become more autonomous, so their relationships with state & companies 
change. Hence the imperative of recognising that the ‘triangle’ of state-civil 
society-economy may become quadrilateral in which the military acts in a manner 
increasingly independent of the state in both economic & security (& hence 
political) matters: soldiers in business & soldiers as mercenaries. In which case, 
notions of civil-military relations are in for a profound shock! 
 
Such reconsiderations, verging on revisionism treated in the final pair of sections 
below, were reinforced at the dawn of the new century a) by critiques of Western & 
multilateral involvements in Rwanda leading to genocide (Andersen 2000, Uvin 
1998) & b) by revelations about the real interests in the political economy of 
conflict; i.e. the profitability of ‘blood’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds etc (Reno 1998, 
Smillie et al 2000). In turn, these led to diplomatic or policy reevaluations, typified 
by the trio of Canadian–related reports (Fowler 2000, Harker 2000, Smillie et al 
2000) treated in penultimate final section below. 
 
i)       Proliferating Conflicts/problematic responses 
“During 1998 there was a return to the larger scale wars not seen since the 1960s, 
engulfing many states in sub-Saharan Africa in bloody turmoil. Of the 45 countries 
in the region, over 20 are involved in conflict, or directly affected by it. One of the 
most critical and worrying developments has been the escalation of Africa’s wars 
from internal conflicts to regional wars as states abandoned any reluctance to 
cross borders.” (IISS, 1999a: 233). 
 
This paper seeks to describe and explain such a negative transition about conflicts 
on the continent back towards pessimism in 1998/9, by highlighting a set of new 
factors and contexts post-bipolarity/-apartheid/-neoliberalism. Africa at the start of 
the new century reveals an apparently disturbing paradox: an encouraging growth 
in both formal democracy and civil society yet, simultaneously, an increase in 
conflict which seems to revive and reflect divisions over ethnicities, regionalisms, 
religions etc. Thus, positive directions, such as an invigorated media and energetic 
coalitions over new issues like bio-diversity and land mines, are counter-balanced 
by negative trends apparent in proliferating conflicts as indicated below. 
 
Such seeming contradictions are rendered more understandable by reference to two 
decades of determined, often dogmatic, neoliberal conditionalities reinforced by the 
competitive impulses and demands of exponential globalisations. These have lead 
to intensified inequalities in which the majority have been further impoverished 
while a minority prospers: a veritable powder-keg in an already underdeveloped 
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area, apparent in the real economic intents increasingly revealed behind many civil 
conflicts (see iv) below). 
 
In turn, such inequalities have helped to spawn a new set of ‘non-traditional’ 
security issues which reduce levels of ‘human security’ (Canada 2000, UNDP, 
1999, UNESCO 2000) such as economic, ecological gender & social security, 
especially threats from gangs & guns, droughts & floods, migrations & refugees, 
infectious diseases & viruses etc. These have served to intensify traditional as well 
as new varieties of insecurity or threat, exacerbated by the proliferation of non-state 
(i.e. private) as well as state security formations as indicated in sections iii) & iv) 
below. Thus, for example, the transnational flow of labour from Lesotho to the 
industrial & mineral heartland of South Africa has been replaced by that of water; 
both can generate tensions as well as collaboration (and ‘rent’) notwithstanding a 
SADC protocol on shared water-courses. 
 
Given the striking overview of the opening citation, despite the Africanisation of 
civil wars, conflicts in Africa – both more traditional & non-traditional - have 
increasingly become of global concern, whether Western states so wish or not. This 
is particularly so for diasporas and for crisis or developmental NGOs around the 
North Atlantic both of whom generate internal pressures for active responses. So, 
unlike the Cold War period before the 1990s, Western involvement is no longer an 
echo of broader bipolar tensions. Further, the wars themselves are typically 
domestic in origin even if they become regional in scope in terms of scale of 
conflicts and nature of responses. Yet, as proposed already, their internal causes 
cannot be separated from international contexts, particularly neoliberalism as 
ideology and globalisations as condition. In short, the characteristic mixture of 
economic stagnation and growing inequality is a flammable one, even if it has not 
always lead to overt antagonism and confrontation, in part because of some 
authoritarian reactions as well as anarchic conditions. 
 
The emergence of regional arms races as well as conflicts has profound 
developmental implications as human and financial resources get diverted into the 
military. Prospects for regional development recede as conflicts both escalate & 
proliferate. And such negative consequences increase with the proliferation of 
short-term peacekeeping operations for both militaries & NGOs. Such negative 
developmental implications of civil wars are further magnified if parallel private 
sectors & interests are also recognised. And the longer-term implications of 
protracted conflict for both civil-military relations as well as the corruption of civic 
culture/civil society is equally worrisome, tending to undermine any apparent 
progress towards formal democratic processes. 
 
 
 
4
Just as the last few months and years of the century generated a roller-coaster in 
terms of Afro-optimism leading back to –pessimism, so they also experienced a 
growing reluctance of the West to be involved in African conflicts. As the IISS 
(1999a: 235) indicates, the continent’s apparent renewed ‘propensity for conflict 
has dismayed the West. It has withdrawn further from involvement in the resolution 
of conflicts, underscoring Africa’s strategic insignificance in its eyes’. Likewise, 
the UN, despite the eloquent pleas of its African Secretary-General, has also 
revealed greater reluctance, in part as the major powers reduced their exposure in 
its remaining operations given their preoccupation with former Yugoslavia. Given 
the complexities and imponderables of such ‘complex peace operations’ (UN 2000: 
48), by the decade’s end, symbolised by Congo, the Horn & Sierra Leone, the UN 
had successfully reduced its role and exposure while other actors came to increase 
theirs, whether regional inter-governmental groupings and/or willing coalitions of 
states and/or private companies (Anglin 1999: 123).  
 
The possibilities of a new ‘balance of power’ in Africa is reflected in part not only 
by Northern reservations but also in ‘a growing propensity by African states – or at 
least their leaders – to insist on sorting out their own problems, even if this means 
with a military solution’ (IISS 1999a: 235). Symptomatically, in the new 
millennium there was renewed pressure on erstwhile ‘middle powers’ like Nigeria 
and South Africa to play their rightful roles, either through ECOMOG or SADC or 
directly, perhaps as part of an African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), possibly 
with logistic assistance from supportive NATO members. While the two ‘giants’ of 
Sub-Saharan Africa have begun to talk about and co-ordinate such responses, 
neither have the resources or stomach for protracted adventures in Central or West 
Africa in the first decade of the new century given their recent domestic and 
regional histories (see Mark Malan ‘Peacekeeping in Africa’ in SAIIA, 1999: 267-
280). 
 
Moreover, as suggested below, conflict and conflict-resolution in Africa as 
elsewhere no longer involve only states as actors, given relentless pressures on 
them to both downsize and democratise from donors and investors alike: the 
imperative of economic and political liberalisations. Rather, after two decades of 
neo-classical ‘structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the relations between 
state & non-state actors have changed fundamentally: the former is no longer 
effectively hegemonic let alone sovereign given the rise of private & civil society 
organisations. But, as indicated below, the changing divisions of labour in Africa as 
elsewhere between state and non-state actors may yet lead towards a genuine and 
sustainable renaissance. 
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Moreover, while a few people and communities have benefited from being able to 
ride market forces, the majority have been further impoverished, leading to 
dramatic inequalities, with profound social & security implications. Hence the 
symbolic ‘Battle of Seattle’ at century’s end, possibly marking a turning–point in 
the heretofore unquestioned hegemony of the neoliberal ‘globalisation’ project, 
with profound implications for the prospects of African development in the first 
decade of the new century and beyond. 
 
Nowadays, then, both conflicts and responses to them increasingly involve a range 
of heterogeneous actors at all levels, from local to global. So, in addition to official 
actors, private companies and non-governmental organisations are associated with 
peacekeeping policies and practices in Africa as elsewhere. Given the complexities 
as well as protractedness of contemporary peace-building let alone constraints on 
governments’ budgets and roles, we may expect such non-state actors to come to 
play increasingly central roles in peace operations in the new century. So it is not 
only Canada’s reactions to the pressures of peace-building which generate MNC 
and NGO involvement (see viii) below; all state and inter-state institutions are 
under pressure from and co-ordinate with a variety of non-state agencies in both 
specific and general policies and practices over peace support measures. Kofi 
Annan in his millennium review characterises these as ‘complex peace operations’ 
(UN 2000: 48) rather than ‘complex political emergencies’ (Cliffe 1999). Such 
continuous forms of communication and co-ordination among the trio of actor 
types at all levels, as illustrated below, can be regarded as a novel variety of 
governance. I propose the notion of ‘peace-building governance’ to embrace such 
processes and policies. 
 
Moreover, such apparent reversals in hierarchies or fortunes among a variety of 
intra- and extra-African actors reveal profound limitations in our own misleading, 
overly fashionable, analytic perspectives and policy projections. No established 
frameworks such as constructivism, dependency, idealism, or realism, are 
especially useful given the complexities of contemporary ‘African’ conflicts (see 
Eboe Hutchful ‘Understanding the African Security Crisis’ in Musah & Fayemi 
(2000): 210-232) although, perhaps surprisingly, political economy may help 
explain at least some such conflicts in certain but not all regions (see v) & vii) 
below) (Dunn & Shaw 2001). I also attempt in this inaugural contribution to 
investigate the implications of such conflicts for Canadian as well as other 
countries’ foreign policy, both state and non-state - i.e. for Canadian and other 
companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as for federal, 
provincial and city governments. The Canadian connection is especially relevant 
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for some African states/regions given growing mutual interests in the mining & 
related sectors. 
 
This paper contemplates, then, a possible ‘conjuncture’ in terms of the fin de siecle 
which in turn provides an entry point for an overview of the (deficient) state of 
security studies on/about the continent as indicated in the final pair of sections 
below, with relevance for other regions as well as for other policies. 
 
ii) What ‘African Renaissance’? Back to Afro-pessimism 
“Africa, long the poor cousin of a resurgent Asia, is beginning to emerge from 
under its shadow. Stock market jitters and fears of state collapse relate to 
Indonesia, not Africa. The continent’s long-heralded renaissance is at last 
capturing the imagination of the world…” (Anglin 1998: 103) 
 
Thabo Mbeki’s proclamation of a continental renaissance captured the relatively 
ebullient mood of the mid-1990s. Unhappily, at least thus far, it has turned out to 
be a fleeting moment. His timing seemed to be impeccable as it coincided with an 
unanticipated period of Asian crises rather than miracles and of Africa’s apparent 
rejuvenation, symbolised by President Clinton’s visit; i.e. African rather than Asian 
values? (cf Shaw & Nyang’oro 2000) Certainly, according to the new President’s 
brother, Moeletsi Mbeki (“The African Renaissance” SAIIA 1998: 209-217), this 
was not to be another state-led bubble such as followed other ‘triumphal’ first-
generation leaders on acceding to power. Rather Thabo sought to recognise and 
encourage, even embolden, new social forces on the continent around the economy 
and civil society: new (local) captains of industry and the professions, civil 
societies (especially NGOs), trade unions and think-tanks (as noted below) etc. Yet, 
notwithstanding elements of such redirection/redevelopment, such as the ‘trek’ by 
South African entrepreneurs and franchisers throughout the continent, by end of the 
1990s the later was characterised by a proliferation of conflicts rather than 
intensification of renaissance? Nevertheless, authors like Chris Lansberg & Shaun 
MacKay (‘The Meaning and Context of the “African Renaissance”: wake up’ in 
Mekenkamp (ed) (1999): 17-24) suggest that the renaissance itself can yet be 
advanced though such conflict prevention/confidence-building roles, even if a year 
ago Anglin (1999: 95) asserted that ‘renaissance was in remission’. 
 
The continent continues to be under pressure to define its own variety of (very!) 
complex peace operations given the number and character of its current conflicts 
(Adedeji 1999). Such definitions would involve not only military responses but 
also NGO roles: onto a distinctive ‘African’ pattern of subcontracting? But as 
emphasised in section v) below, neither the continent nor its conflicts are 
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homogeneous so no one agreed response is likely to be efficacious everywhere: 
from Sierra Leone to Somalia? From the Horn to Angola? So a range of appropriate 
reactions is necessary: from confidence-building/track two pacific ‘negotiations’ 
through peace-keeping & -building to peace-enforcement or ‘robust’ interventions 
(cf Anglin 1999, UN 2000: 43-53). At each of these stages, different types of NGO 
partners and partnerships would be essential if sustainable peace is to become 
feasible let alone realisable: forms of peace-building governance. But such stages 
of escalation and reconciliation/reconstruction do not always follow in sequence. 
And in reality, personalities and precedents, let alone diversity of international 
associates, both state/inter-state and NGO, can complicate: the diplomacy as well 
as strategy of peace-keeping. Just as the Asian crisis generated forms of regional 
economic and financial responses, so Africa’s conflicts will lead to novel types of 
continental diplomatic and strategic reactions in the first decade of the new century 
and beyond (Stremlau 2000), as indicated in vii) below. 
 
Significantly, the OAU has attempted to move beyond its traditional respect of 
formal state ‘sovereignty’ in terms of both regional initiatives over peace-keeping 
interventions and efforts at containment of the mercenary threat, even if the later 
dates back to the late-1970s. Any such continent-wide legal regime would have to 
be realistic about the causes of such privatisation and also begin to develop post-
conflict forms for war crimes tribunals etc as in the case of the Arusha court 
proceedings prosecuting perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda & the courageous 
report prepared by the OAU’s International Panel of Eminent Personalities to 
Investigate the 1994 Genocide.  
 
The prospect of such innovations is improved by the emergence throughout the 
continent of non-state think tanks, which focus on the range of new responses to 
conflicts. These may also be involved in direct ‘track two’ type confidence- and 
peace-building activities in addition to engaging in informed analysis and creative 
policy inputs (Mbabazi, MacLean & Shaw 2000, MacLean & Shaw 2000). Such 
non-governmental institutions are especially well-developed in South Africa – e.g. 
ACCORD, CCR, ISS & SAIIA (all listed in References below) - but may also be 
found elsewhere, such as the Centre for Foreign Relations in Dar es Salaam and the 
Nigerian Institute for International Affairs in Lagos. They have come to reflect 
growing continental and global concerns such as peacekeeping, small 
arms/landmines etc. And, typically, they connect with national NGO networks as 
well as with conflict-resolution needs, as reflected in the informed but also 
concerned collection from the Centre for Democracy & Development on 
Mercenaries (Musah & Fayemi 2000). They have also begun to engage in training 
for indigenous capacity in peace building, both military & NGO (e.g. Southern 
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African Network for Defence & Security Management based at the University of 
the Witwatersrand). The maturation of such institutions and their roles is apparent 
in two massive compendiums at the turn of the century on conflict prevention & 
peacekeeping on the continent (Beman & Sams 2000, Mekenkamp 1999). 
However, Dwan (2000: 107) cautions that there may be a gap between number of 
such agencies & their effectiveness in this case: 
 
“Africa outranks all other regions in the number & scope of institutions addressing 
the prevention, management & resolution of conflicts, and the international 
community continues to emphasize the need to further develop these capabilities. 
Conflicts in 1999, however, illustrate the difficulty of this task…” 
 
iii) Governance in Africa: resilient regimes 
“The escalation of Africa’s wars led to a large increase in the regional arms 
market.”  
(IISS 1999b: 247) 
 
Notwithstanding the local to global pressures for increased democratisation and 
demilitarisation throughout the continent, the revival in the fortunes of the military 
is apparent in renewed battles and the related gradual rearmament of several armies 
and air forces, especially in one or two regions like the Horn or Southern Africa. 
By century’s end, military expenditure on statutory formations totalled US$10 
billion; it is unlikely to decline in the first decade of the new millennium. Such 
diversions of scarce resources into the military let alone other expenditures on 
elusive private security are indicative of the real costs of protracted conflict. These 
have profound negative consequences for regional development, business 
confidence, foreign investment etc; i.e. the further postponement of basic 
needs/human security. 
 
The unexpected conflicts within two of the continent’s most promising ‘New 
African’ alliances confounded advocates of any African renaissance or emerging 
markets. Thus, in mid-1998, there was a renewed battle between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (despite the historical collaboration between Meles Zenawi & Issaias 
Afewerki, respectively, comparable to the brotherly spats between Museveni and 
Kagame?!) which remains unresolved in the new decade, with devastating 
economic and ecological implications, even if Ethiopia claimed victory in June 
2000. Similarly, the close relationship between Kagame’s Rwandan & Museveni’s 
Ugandan soldiers who had together been occupying Eastern Congo, concentrated 
around the mineral centre of Kisangani, broke down, leading to major battles 
around the beleaguered city between them in May/June 2000. If the latter entailed 
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real immediate economic interests along the lines suggested in the next section, the 
former had no apparent mercenary cause although profound negative economic 
consequences. But such conflicts and alliances tend to spill-over into neighbouring 
territories, exacerbating regional tensions; e.g. from Congo & Angola into 
Namibia, especially the northern Caprivi Strip; and from Ethiopia/Eritrea into the 
Sudan, Djibouti & Somalia. Some Zimbabwean troops moved on from Congo to 
fight with MPLA in Angola in the final (?!) assault against Unita, which in turn has 
had some association with the RCD faction in eastern Congo supported by Rwanda 
(cf v) below). 
 
Such unwelcome and unanticipated circumstances have brought a rapid end to any 
notion of a post-apartheid/-bipolarity ‘peace dividend’ and make it increasingly 
possible to consider the outbreak of regional arms races at the turn of the century. 
 
Such rearmament has been facilitated by sales & finance from South Africa and 
former Eastern Bloc countries & companies – Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic & 
Ukraine as well as Russia - not just NATO members. The formers’ arms producers 
are now largely privatised and so determined (desperate?) to improve market share. 
Such market-induced competitiveness has profound implications for peace and 
security on the continent. Its not only AK-47s that are now available at firesale 
prices: recent model armoured vehicles & tanks, jet fighters, missiles etc are also! 
 
The hardware costs of such competitive rearming are high, with profound 
implications for regional development at the start of the millennium. Thus, South 
Africa expects to spend some US$5 billion on a range of high-tech weaponry in the 
first decade of the new century: three submarines & four frigates for the navy from 
Germany; 40 helicopters from Italy; & up to 28 fighter jets for the airforce from the 
UK. In this case, industrial offsets & related development projects for the country 
from these EU suppliers are expected to total some US$ 17 bn over the same 
period. But the direct & indirect costs remain significant, in addition to the dangers 
of an arms race in Southern Africa. Botswana has already reinforced its airforce & 
army; and Zimbabwe has been buying MIGs, helicopter gunships & military trucks 
for its Congo adventure following its earlier, controversial receipt of Hawk fighter 
jets with spare parts from the UK. 
 
The operational costs of the continent’s wars are also rising, paid in part by the 
militaries’ direct sale of minerals etc. Thus, Angola’s internal war costs over US$ 1 
billion per annum; that in the Sudan over US $400m pa; while Ethiopia spends over 
$450m & Eritrea some $200m each year on their classic stand-off in the desert. 
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Hence the importance of oil income for both the embattled Luanda & Khartoum 
regimes, enhanced at century’s dawn by the increased world price of oil. 
 
Moreover, escalation towards regional arms races is not only a function of threat 
perceptions or pressures from (now privatised) arms dealers. It is also a reaction 
towards the privatisation of security throughout the continent as indicated below: 
national armies seek firepower against private forces just as the latter do against 
each other. Such private as well as public arms races may prove even harder to 
contain and reverse than traditional inter-state escalations. 
 
iv)       Privatisation of Security? 
“…regional and civil conflict continues to tear central Africa apart and there is no 
sign of an African Renaissance. The only beneficiaries of the new era of chaos and 
widespread destabilization are the arms dealers, illicit traders and the mercenary 
and private security forces that continue to find abundant employ in the central 
African maelstrom.” (Khareen Pech ‘The Hand of War: mercenaries in the former 
Zaire 1996-97” in Musah & Fayemi 2000: 149). 
 
Just as conflict on the continent is not longer simply inter- or intra-state, so security 
forces are no longer only official. Rather, at least three forms of ‘privatisation’ are 
apparent, with profound implications for both the incidence & resolution of conflict 
(Cilliers & Mason 1999). In this regard, as in the peacekeeping ‘industry’, Africa is 
in the avant garde (Muthien & Taylor 2000). 
 
First, perhaps the most clear-cut form of privatisation of security arrangements is 
the establishment & deployment of private forces, whether they be characterised as 
armies or militias. The most familiar or notorious of such mercenary operations is 
Executive Outcomes, but as indicated below in fact it is but one of several such 
private formations. It and others have been most active in contexts of anarchy such 
as Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone; i.e. where embattled regimes have resources to 
but such services in part as they seek to ensure control over energy and/or mineral 
resources. Moreover, such mercenary formations recruit globally so that their 
‘soldiers of fortune’ may be sourced from ex-settler armies, former East European 
militaries, ex-gangs etc, raising a variety of ‘foreign policy’/international legal 
issues as indicated in the final section as well as in the CDD’s collection on 
Mercenaries (Musah & Fayemi 2000). 
 
Second, a recent phenomenon is the apparent willingness of some African states or 
regimes to sell their official, statutory troops and services for a price, whether it be 
for UN or other peace-keeping operations (e.g. Sierra Leone) or to shore-up 
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embattled regimes (e.g. Angola and Congo). In these cases, regimes seek to 
circumvent international conditionalities, which seek to place limits on military 
budgets on grounds of either diverting development expenditures or constraining 
global competitiveness. They may also seek to ‘export’ difficult or unreliable 
military units. The dispatch of such expeditionary forces to other African countries 
enables regimes to attract foreign exchange either for arms purchases or for 
personal accumulation. For example, Kenya has developed something of a niche in 
terms of peacekeeping so that its troops can be rewarded and re-equipped. By 
contrast, the Zimbabwean army in Congo via the Osleg mineral agreement with its 
opposite numbers in the Kabila regime, is a conduit for resources to flow to 
President Mugabe’s closest political associates while its soldiers are dying in an 
unwinnable war. As Anglin (1999: 112-113) noted last year, General Zvinavashe’s 
transport company is the major source of logistics to (his!) army in Congo! In short, 
in at least some instances, African peacekeepers are on sale to the highest bidder. 
 
Finally, third, the most problematic form of privatisation is the proliferation of 
gangs and mafias, again the African variant of global phenomena. These seek to 
maximise their incomes through control over drugs and guns, but also diamonds 
and emeralds. They may be centred on demobilised troops as in post-conflict 
situations like South Africa and Uganda. And they may also serve as the African 
associates of global mafia networks in terms of drug routes etc. In any event, they 
seriously challenge the continent’s inadequate law and order structures, often 
corrupting or circumventing them (‘Business in Difficult Places’ 2000). 
 
The proliferation of a variety of private security organisations on the continent 
complicates both civil-military relations (see vi) below) as well as conflict 
resolution, let alone roles of international organisations/law. For any effective 
peace operation now has to take into account the likelihood that it will have to deal 
with not only warring armies but also with a fluid mix of mercenary, mafia and 
gang involvements. Peacekeeping had already become complex as it no longer 
entails only adopting an interposition between two opposing militaries. It had 
already come to involve ‘partnerships’ with a variety of diverse NGOs. Now it also 
involves the infinitely more problematic task of not only mediating among a range 
of political forces but also dealing with the presence of criminal organisations. This 
poses profound challenges to the foreign policies of other states, let alone those of 
MNCs & NGOs, as indicated in the case of Canada treated below. For example, 
following international revelations of diamonds as a primary cause of conflict 
(Smillie et al 2000), in October 1999, De Beers moved to implement UN sanctions 
against unofficial stones from Angola and elsewhere on the continent (De Beers 
1999: 57): 
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“De Beers now has no buying offices in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
or Guinea. Operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone ceased many years ago… 
no diamonds are being purchased from areas in Africa currently controlled by 
rebel forces… 
 
De Beers has urged the international diamond industry to adopt similar policies. 
We have also expressed our strong concern that the legitimate diamond industry, 
which accounts for the overwhelming majority of world production, should not be 
damaged by laudable attempts to reduce the income flowing to rebel movements.” 
 
The contrast in the developmental impacts of the production & distribution of gems 
from divergent small states like Botswana & Sierra Leone is palpable. The former 
has been Africa’s fastest growing economy for several years; by contrast the latter 
typically comes last in the list of countries in the UNDP’s annual human 
development index. But the cumulative impacts of ‘dirty diamonds’ on De Beers & 
other formal sector producers (states & companies as well as labour & 
communities) cannot be minimised, hence the Kimberley summit on diamonds in 
May 2000 bringing together levels of government (from local to global as well as 
national & provincial), labour & NGOs as well as capital to limit the negative spill-
over (see final section ix) below). As the Economist indicated in May 2000 in a 
report noting that 'The situation for De Beers is tricky'’, the CSO is facing the 
danger of long-term reputational risk: it’s hard to contain the erosion of such 
elusive status. A month later in a longer section on ‘The Diamond Business’, 
subtitled ‘Washed out of Africa’, it again looked at the myriad challenges facing 
De Beers. 
 
Relatedly, there is a growing literature on private security companies with 
particular resonance in Africa, although such distinctive corporations have bases 
and operations in other continents, notably the former Soviet bloc (see Cilliers & 
Mason 1999, Francis 2000, Musah & Fayemi 2000, Shearer 1998a & b). But 
among such leading ‘private military companies’ (Kevin A O’Brien ‘Private 
Military Companies & African Security, 1990-98’ in Musah & Fayemi (2000): 43-
75), Sandline International has its HQ in London and that for Military Professional 
Resources Incorporated is in Washington, DC. The former operates Branch-
Heritage mineral and energy activities in parts of Africa as well as in mining 
centres like Australia and Canada (e.g. Robert Friedland’s Diamondworks, 
formally a Vancouver-based ‘junior’) while the latter supplies a variety of 
contractual services to the Pentagon. But Executive Outcomes as part of the 
Strategic Resources Corporation is still the best-known and most expansive 
‘transnational mercenary corporation’ according to Muthien (2000), even if it has 
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been formally disbanded. According to the chart in Musah & Fayemi (2000: xvi) 
on ‘The Anatomy of Interlocking Mining & Mercenary Network’, it was associated 
with Saracen International and its well connected associates, some with close 
connections to African presidential offices. Many of the executives in such security 
companies come from British, South African and other military and intelligence 
forces, particularly those used in the apartheid regime’s destabilisation activities in 
the 1970s & 1980s. And they increasingly hire East Europeans who were trained 
and employed in the Soviet and other eastern bloc militaries until the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
According to Howe (1998), Mills & Stremlau (1999), Musah & Fayemi (2000), 
Shearer (1998a & b) etc both mining companies and international financial 
institutions as well as national regimes – a distinctive ‘unholy alliance’ or 
entrepreneurial coalition?! - have come to sanction the hiring of such private 
security forces in tough times/places, such as Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone. 
Reflective of the new revisionist/realist mood, William Shawcross (2000) has 
begun to advocate mercenary interventions when necessary if other 
actions/sanctions have been insufficient. But perhaps even more surprisingly, 
NGOs engaged in peace building have likewise come to consider the 
possibility/necessity of such contracts. In ‘Mean Times’, a report for CARE Canada 
and related Canadian and global NGOs on ‘Humanitarian Action in Complex 
Political Emergencies: stark choices, cruel dilemmas’, Bryans, Jones & Stein 
(1999) come to recommend that: ‘NGOs should consider the privatisation of 
security for humanitarian purposes’ (see ix) below). Such hitherto unthinkable 
possibilities pose profound challenges for both analysis & practice, whether 
established academics so recognise or not, as indicated in the final sections.  
 
v) New Realisms: onto security communities? 
“The conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly becoming regionalised and 
are hence difficult to analyse in isolation from each other. Many conflicts in the 
subregion are connected through cross-border interests & actors, and there is an 
increase of various types of external (African) military involvement in the internal 
conflicts.” (Sollenberg 1999: 23) 
 
A kaleidoscopic array of inter-regime ‘alliances’ has come to characterise African 
inter-state relations since independence. In addition to continental coalitions around 
the founding of the OAU, a series of sub-continental networks emerged in Eastern 
and then Southern Africa in the post-colonial era over regional integration and 
national liberation, as indicated in Anglin (1989: 127) on state-‘liberation 
movement’ connections in the Horn at the end of the Cold War. As the latest 
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Strategic Survey from the IISS (2000) suggests, today both the Horn & the Great 
Lakes Region are characterised by ‘interlocking wars’ based on tactical rather than 
continuing patterns of alliance. 
 
By the turn of the century, Africa had considerable experience of shifting intra- as 
well as extra-continental coalitions, which have increasingly come to involve non-
state actors as well as national regimes. The initial Mulungushi Club of first-
generation presidents and the anti-apartheid grouping of Front Line States evolved, 
partially in opposition to the ‘unholy alliance’ of the white regimes, into the initial 
SADCC, a pro-majority rule and anti-destabilisation network. In some ways, they 
also anticipated the late-1990s association of ‘New Africans’, the core advocates of 
an African renaissance. But the bipolar configuration of the post-war era also 
encouraged Cold War divisions, apparent in the competitive external associations 
of the liberation movements. 
 
The nearly simultaneous ending of bipolarity and of apartheid in the early-1990s 
permitted a brief interregnum in which a set of alternative alliances seemed to be 
feasible. Thus in response to a set of interrelated opportunities in Central Africa as 
well as majority rule in South Africa, a new informal association of ‘New Africans’ 
emerged to advance an African renaissance: in addition to Mbeki in South Africa 
and Museveni in Uganda, Kagame in Rwanda and Afwerki in Eritrea. For a 
moment in the mid-1990s it seemed as if together they might dispel lingering 
ghosts about African disunity: a regional African ‘security community’ seemed to 
be in prospect. Thus, even if the recent comparative case studies of such 
communities assembled by Adler & Barnett (1998) failed to include a chapter on 
Africa, informed observers of the continent might have been able to outline at least 
one such embryonic community around the New African network. 
 
However, unhappily, the quagmire of Congo – ‘one of the world’s most 
complicated wars…one of the world’s most troubling…’ (Seybolt 2000: 59) - soon 
dragged down even this resilient grouping. As the IISS Strategic Survey (1999a: 
235) suggests, ‘The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has perhaps the most 
serious implications for the continent”. So 1998 witnessed an unexpected 
proliferation of interventions in the heart of the continent, with an unlikely alliance 
of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe advancing their own nefarious interests in parts 
of that troubled ‘country’ (see Musah & Fayemi 2000). Similarly, despite their 
long-standing alliance (since meeting in school in Mbarara, two decades for the two 
leaders involved, Kagame & Museveni), the mid-1998 front between Rwandese 
and Ugandan forces around Kisangani also fractured by mid-1999, in part as a 
result of losing ground in the centre of the country, close to the Zaire River, to pro-
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Kabila forces from SADC states This lead to a year long stand-off which 
exacerbated divisions in the respective Congolese allies of the Eastern Africans: as 
indicated below, the Rwandese-supported RCD split between Wamba & Ilunga 
factions while the Ugandans continued to support Bemba’s MLC, notwithstanding 
a series of presidential agreements to cooperate/coexist (Reno 2000)  
 
Whilst there has been a series of largely African state-led efforts in regional, 
continental & global fora to negotiate & implement cease-fires, such as the mid-
1999 Lusaka Accord, in reality Congo has been partitioned by a group of 
neighbouring leaders who have paid their statutory forces by allowing (some!) 
access to the loot, with profound long-term implications in terms of civil-military 
relations, corruption etc (see below). Thus by century’s end, a hundred years since 
the Berlin conference, Congo was again divided not between imperial powers, but 
among African regimes: 
 
a) south-east under Emil Ilunga’s RCD faction in association with Rwanda; 
 
b) central-eastern under Ernest Wamba dia Wamba’s RCD faction in association 
with Uganda; 
 
c) north-east: the MLC of Jean Pierre Bemba in association with Uganda; and, 
finally, the official ‘sovereign’ regime: 
 
d) a strip along the west & south-west: Kabila’s supposed ‘national government’ 
(see ARB especially boxes on “DRC Peace Plan & Battle-lines” in 36(7), 26 
August 1999: p13624 & “DRC: neighbourly economic colonialism” in 36(9), 8 
November 1999: p14058). 
 
Hence the intense battles around Kisangani between Rwandese & Ugandan soldiers 
in mid-2000 (Seybolt 2000). 
 
The complexities of such interrelated, regionalised struggles on the continent are 
well-captured by Margareta Sollenberg et al (1999: 23): 
 
“Three types of external (intra-African) military involvement can be seen: 
 
a) external military assistance, including either arms sales of direct military 
support to a government (e.g. Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC); 
b) direct military intervention of foreign troops directed against a government (e.g. 
Rwanda’s & Uganda’s intervention in the DRC); & 
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c) indirect external intervention, that is, support of various kinds to rebel groups 
operating against a government (e.g. Sudan’s support of the LRA & the ADF in 
Uganda in the form of arms & logistic assistance). 
 
A fourth type of external involvement, that by countries outside Africa, has become 
less explicit since the end of the Cold War, although it still exists.” 
 
We have already considered above in part iv) to what extent these actions were 
taken in the ‘national interest’ of either recipient or advocate. So, by the dawn of 
the twenty-first century, interrelated notions of African renaissance and security 
community seemed to have become but fanciful dreams (Shaw 1998). And, as we 
have already seen in iii) above, not only wasteful conflicts but also longer-term 
regional arms races seemed all too likely. As the IISS (1999b: 246) suggested: 
‘Escalation of armed conflict in Africa has resulted in a significant increase in the 
region’s military spending’. 
 
As already noted, Douglas Anglin (1998: 127) creatively outlined a set of 
interrelated inter-state alliances in Eastern Africa, even he soon came to recognise 
that these are overly personal and changeable (1999): novel, ‘African’ forms of 
‘civil-military relations’! However, his approach assumed that only state actors 
were involved as opposed to the range of heterogeneous types of actors in today’s 
Africa. Moreover, in a post-bipolar context, the diversity of non-state as well as 
state actors today complicates the quest for simple patterns of alliances in both 
practice and theory as indicated in the final pair of sections below. This is so for 
both novel peacekeeping ventures as well as for more traditional military 
adventures. Thus, any aspiration towards a security community, as a logical, 
compatible correlate of renaissance, is likely to necessitate a long-term vision and 
strategy, which hard-pressed regimes can hardly articulate let alone sustain, 
especially given the diversions of privatisations. 
 
Post-apartheid Southern Africa may have come closest to the creation of such a 
security community in the mid-1990s when traditions of associations, even 
alliances, among the liberation movement led to the re-structured and -directed 
SADC. But any positive legacy from the Inter-State Security & Defence 
Committee (ISSDC) dissipated in the acrimonious debates about the new 
Community’s ‘Organ on Politics, Defence & Security’. And divisions further 
hardened over the late-1990s interventions in Lesotho and Congo by the militaries 
from two distinct & exclusive sets of regional states. In short, the positive aura 
arising from the transition in South Africa soon evaporated, particularly in bilateral 
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South African-Zimbabwean relations, leading not only to diplomatic difficulties but 
also to competitive rearmaments. 
 
vi) Civil-military Relations: how civil? What military? 
“The military, in and out of uniform, remain a potent force in Africa politics.’ 
(Anglin 1999: 102) 
 
Apparent rearmament along with renewed conflicts have served to rescue the 
military from relative obscurity. Yet renewed facilities and roles only reinforce the 
imperative of renewed attention to effective civilian control if democratisation is to 
be enhanced and de facto privatisation of statutory forces contained, even reversed. 
Douglas Anglin’s assertion above is only half the story: as we have already seen, 
the military is increasingly potent in economics as well as politics! Yet civil-
military relations on the continent have been ignored, to the peril of civilian 
decision-making, as Martin Rupiya (2000) presciently indicated recently in the case 
of Zimbabwe ahead of the fraught mid-2000 elections in a plea for attention to the 
process of militarisation in Zimbabwe.  
 
Moreover, by century’s end it was apparent that any effective civilian oversight had 
to be reconstituted in at least a couple of ways. First, ‘civilian’ needed to be 
extended beyond the non-military state including parliament to the involvement of 
NGOs. And second, ‘military’ needed to be extended beyond official security 
forces to include private operators, from security guards to mercenaries, with 
several intermediary types. Such civil-military relations are especially important as 
well as problematic in ubiquitous peace-building operations where the roles of 
NGOs as partners of the militaries are crucial if human security is to be advanced 
so facilitating human development. And the recent instances of unilateral 
presidential instructions ordering supposedly national armies into Congo (i.e. 
Mugabe & Nujoma) (Rupiya 2000, Lamb 1999, respectively) constitute blatant 
disregard of democratic or institutional checks-and-balances, by contrast to 
neighbouring South Africa, at least for now! Moreover, military involvement in 
foreign wars always entails a risk that solders will return with new ideas and/or 
property – i.e. political or financial corruption - as was the case with African troops 
in World War Two and Tanzanian soldiers who helped to liberate Uganda from the 
tyrannies of Amin & Obote II. Service in Congo today is unlikely to encourage 
positive social and political development among SADC or East African militaries! 
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vii) New Regionalisms: onto zones of peace? 
“The continent comprises many Africas.” (Anglin 1999: 96). 
 
The above range of apparent diversities in civil-military relations, peace-building 
partnerships and related privatisations, suggests the need to reconsider whether 
there can ever be one singular continental perspective or rather a group of regional 
forms. Africa has had a varied set of historical experiences, in terms of imperial 
connections and economic relations, let alone ecological contexts. Just as Samir 
Amin proposed a trio of Africas in the early-1970s so, at the turn of the century, 
learning from Douglas Anglin’s above diktat, we might identify several distinct 
regions in terms of types of conflict and in terms of peace-making responses, 
informed by insights drawn from the embryonic perspectives termed ‘new 
regionalisms’ (Boas 1999, Shaw 1998): 
 
a) non-traditional, largely non-state, conflicts and responses (West Africa & 
Somalia); 
 
b) semi-traditional, semi-state (economic) conflicts and responses (Angola and 
Congo); 
 
c) traditional inter-state/-regime conflicts and responses (e.g. Ethiopia and Eritrea). 
 
Such distinctions would indicate the importance of pragmatic and flexible varieties 
of peace-making interventions from both intra- & extra-regional sources as well as 
the imperative of informed and nuanced analyses if (state & non-state) policy 
responses are to be as appropriate as possible. They also imply the unlikelihood of 
a series of distinct ‘security communities’ on the continent; i.e. one singular 
African renaissance. 
 
Hence the interesting evolution and implementation, concentrated to date in 
Southern Africa, of a set of corridors which constitute potential subregional zones 
of peace. As they involve a range of heterogeneous partners in their governance or 
development, notably local-to-national governments and companies, they can be 
compared to a diverse range of ‘triangles’, often Export-Processing Zones (EPZs), 
in Southeast and East Asia. 
 
Similarly, the diplomacy around and development of trans-frontier or cross-border 
peace-parks offer alternatives to regional conflict, even if they all include South 
Africa as a partner: The first, between Northern Cape & Botswana - Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park - was inaugurated in mid-May 2000. 
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There are several of the former in addition to the most-developed/popularised, the 
Maputo corridor with a total investment by the end of the last century of R35-40 
million (see Jonathan Mitchell “The Maputo Development Corridor” in SAIIA 
1998: 197-208): Beira, Nacala & Tazara historically (related to periods of anti-
settler regimes struggles) and Lubombo and Trans-Kalahari now. More distantly, 
there may yet be corridors through Angola, such as Lobito, into Congo and on to 
Zambia, Malange & Namibe corridors. (Talitha Bertelsmann “Regional Integration 
in Southern Africa” in SAIIA 1998: 177-196) These typically entail public-private 
partnerships centred on major infrastructural developments such as toll roads, 
railways/ports, oil/gas pipelines, mineral extraction/benification etc. Their 
corporate/government sponsorship could be matched by enhanced roles for civil 
societies/small scale entrepreneurs (Taylor 2000). And their implicit human, even 
national, security implications could be made more explicit given their ability to 
attract & facilitate labour migrations etc. 
 
And several of the latter are envisaged among a diversity of bilateral partners – 
Botswana (Tuli), Lesotho (Maloti with Drakensberg), Mozambique (Gaza with 
Kruger and Maputo with Tembe), Namibia (Ais Ais with Richtersveld) & 
Zimbabwe (Gonarezhou with Kruger) - all centred on South Africa. But with a 
couple being trilateral. The ominous prospects of cross-border conflicts rather than 
co-operation was made apparent in the clash between Botswana & Namibia over 
the Okavango (see Motumisi Tawana “SADC Security Issues” in SAIIA 1998: 
189-196). 
 
Both of these two types of sub-regional governance architectures may have 
significant longer-term implications for human security/development, in part as 
they have broader and deeper roots among a diversity of actors – communities, 
economic, ecological, infrastructural, functional, political etc - than merely 
presidential agreements, such as among the ‘New Africans’ in the mid-1990s; i.e. 
the real bases of any sustainable renaissance on the continent. 
 
viii) Implications for Intra- & Extra African Foreign Policies, state and non-state 
“Canada does not have a policy on Africa as such. Instead, it has adopted certain 
themes, many of which, like landmines and child soldiers, are of immediate and 
direct relevance to Africa.” (Anglin 1998: 137) 
 
‘Foreign policy’ of states like Canada (see next paragraph) has had to evolve 
significantly in both post-World War & -Cold War periods, as ranges of both actors 
& issues have evolved. First, in both the post-nationalist & -communist eras, the 
number of states has continued (perhaps somewhat unexpectedly) to multiply. And 
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second, in the 1990s, the scope of global & regional issues has expanded almost 
exponentially. Hence the search by the increasing set of aspiring ‘middle powers’ 
like Canada for a distinctive niche in a world of globalisation & competition. And 
so onto the identification & exploitation by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd 
Axworthy in the mid-1990s as the dilemmas of peacekeeping etc of ‘human 
security’ even if the Canadian government as a whole was going in a contrary neo-
liberal direction. 
 
However, by contrast to the 1950s, in the 1990s, terms like ‘foreign policy’ & 
concepts like ‘Canada’ have become increasingly contested, even if not always so 
recognised throughout the South given the lingering myths of independence, 
sovereignty etc. Certainly, this paper takes it to be axiomatic that, in the twenty-
first century, not only the Canadian & all other ‘states’ but also companies & civil 
societies have their own inter- or Trans-national relations. In the Cold War era, 
when ‘national security’ was assumed to be under threat, foreign policy was more 
singular & focused. By the end of the 1980s, however, after a decade of structural 
adjustment & just ahead of the end of bipolarity, foreign & security policies were 
already starting to fragment everywhere as new threats & actors intruded. A decade 
later, after two decades of neo-liberalism & one of post-bipolarity, the pluralism of 
international relations has become undeniable - multiple issues, fora, coalitions etc 
– even if in general analysis has continued to lag behind practice. 
 
Thus ‘Canadian’ & other (relatively!) ‘enlightened’ ‘internationalist’ interests have 
not only been increasingly articulated by non-state actors, they also gradually 
shifted in focus from the relatively unambiguous concepts of ‘human rights’ in the 
late-1980s (e.g. anti-apartheid) to the more problematic notion of ‘human security’ 
in late-1990s (Anglin 1998: 137-138). Both were appropriate to international 
times/debates & national resources/leaderships etc even though in both these 
contemporary eras, multiple policies were apparently reflective of the place of the 
national political economy in regional affiliations like NAFTA & NATO etc. 
 
To score above its weight, then, Canada, like other competitive middle powers, has 
had to compensate for its limited economic resources with intellectual creativity & 
gravitas. Perhaps the most notable achievement of the current Chretien 
administration has been Lloyd Axworthy’s advocacy & realisation of a global 
landmine treaty, with profound relevance for the killing fields of Afghanistan, 
Cambodia & former Yugoslavia as well as parts of Africa (Anglin 1999: 139-141, 
Tomlin 1998, Tomlin et al 1998). The imperative for such a global agreement came 
out of an unlikely yet symptomatic alliance (see below re parallels in parallel cases 
like ‘dirty diamonds’), the ICBL. But from a handful of NGO associates in Kenya 
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& Norway as well as Canada, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ICBL) is now a major force of global civil society, reflecting the consensus of its 1 
300 members. Thus the Ottawa Process has come to have a life & momentum of its 
own: a model to which alliances around other current global issues can but aspire? 
The mid-1999 Ottawa conference on landmines is being followed by the fall 2000 
global gathering in Winnipeg with UNICEF on children in conflicts. 
 
Symbolically, the fin de siecle was notable for a trio of quite authoritative reports 
on pressing global issues concentrated around the African continent authored & 
animated by Canadian analysts, which emerged from several inter- & non-
governmental organisations: onto policy discourses with NGOs/MNCs etc. To be 
sure, other ‘endangered’ middle powers have been likewise innovative, notably the 
Scandinavians in terms of disinterested diplomacy over the Former Soviet Union & 
Middle East & the South’s parallel G-14 networking over major economic & 
financial issues. 
 
First, Canada’s then-Ambassador to the UN in New York, Robert Fowler, given 
Canada’s election to the Security Council, served as Chair of the UN’s Panel of 
Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA; he prepared a 
critical report for the UN on causes of the conflict in Angola (Fowler Report 2000) 
which named names of UNITA’s high-level accomplices in Africa & Europe; this 
raised a number of sensitive interrelated issues for policy discourses within the UN 
& its member-states. If diamonds (& oil) keep the civil strife alive for both sides, 
then what does that tell you about the intolerable conditions of the majority for 
whom (human) security/development is but a dream. 
 
Second, in response to growing criticism in terms of gender, human rights etc, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs commissioned John Harker et al to draft a report on 
‘Human Security in the Sudan’ (Harker 2000), a professional response to issues of 
abductions of women & abuse of child labour/soldiers along with the issue of a 
Canadian company’s investments in the controversial oil industry & pipeline from 
the South: Talisman Energy. This led to an intense set of analyses & debates 
around a range of possible sanctions, which were not implemented due to 
opposition within North America. But if Canada was compromised by a stand-off 
between capital & labour, the US Department of Commerce faced no such 
constraints: it proceeded to sanction Sudan as a ‘rogue state’ rather than as a threat 
to human security! Meanwhile, reflective of novel forms of labour power & ethical 
considerations with global reach, the large Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund decided 
to sell its shares in Talisman. Furthermore, symptomatic of the difficulties of 
arriving at a consensual foreign policy, Canadian governmental & non-
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governmental organisations failed to reach agreement with Talisman Energy about 
even a possible range of development projects/criteria as a means of making its 
investments in the South more acceptable; i.e. no basis for trust over the proposed 
Trust Fund! 
 
As we have already noted above, issues around the Sudan cannot be separated from 
others in both the Horn & Great Lakes/Central Africa: there are complex & 
changeable alliances amongst a variety of state & non-state actors which stretch 
from Luanda to Asmara, Harare to Khartoum. These have particular import for 
IGAD as well as the OAU/UN in their forlorn attempts to advance track-two type 
confidence building measures in the Horn & elsewhere. And they inform a growing 
concern among NGOs about their own security preparations & intelligence roles. 
Thus ‘Mean Times’ from CARE Canada (Bryans et al 1999) raised issues around 
NGO partnerships in increasingly complex (let alone fraught & dangerous!) peace 
operations: should private security arrangements or contracts be excluded 
altogether or might they become necessary at times if assistance is to be delivered? 
These security issues are vital for Canadian & other militaries as well as research & 
training institutions like the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre at Cornwallis in Nova 
Scotia. 
 
And third, Partnership Africa Canada commissioned Ian Smillie et al to research & 
write a report on the real economic causes of the continuing conflict in the unhappy 
country & region of Sierra Leone. Their report (Smillie et al 2000) on ‘The Heart 
of the Matter; Sierra Leone, diamonds & human security’ succeeded in setting off 
an avalanche over the production chain of ‘dirty’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds & the 
possibilities of sanctioning the informal/illegal sector at certain choke-points. This 
report helped inform & generate parallel debates in a variety of organisations, 
including the US Congress & the UN, along with a remarkable mixed actor 
‘summit’ on diamonds at Kimberley in May 2000. The latter brought together the 
crucial elements in any attempt to contain the negative impacts of informal sector 
extraction & distribution: from capital to labour, environmental & women’s groups 
to non-violent & local communities: the bases of a new form of governance 
appropriate to local to global interests? Symbolically, coinciding with the 
Kimberley deliberations & as the war in Sierra Leone heated up again, De Beers & 
Debswana opened the extension of the Orapa mine in Botswana. The contrast 
between growth levels & standards of living & human development in two small 
diamond-producing African states – Botswana & Sierra Leone - could not be 
starker…with profound implications for analysis & praxis, as suggested below. 
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The mid-May 2000 multi-stakeholder gathering in Kimberley is symptomatic of the 
complexities of state & non-state ‘foreign policy’ in the new century, for a diversity 
of actors in Canada, South Africa etc. It brought Southern African regimes, 
companies, NGOs, think-tanks & unions together to examine the difficulties of 
effecting sanctions against ‘dirty diamonds’ following revelations about diamonds 
as a primary cause of conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone etc from Global Witness, 
Partnership Africa Canada et al. The participants agreed to work through a variety 
of channels to advance effective sanctions: G8 (including Russia), OAU, World 
Diamond Council, World Federation of Diamond Bourses as well as the UN. As De 
Beers recognises, such sanctions are intended not only to deter conflict but also to 
support legitimate enterprises and governments as well as be transformed into 
incentives once conflict ceases and regimes change (De Beers 1999: 14-15): 
 
“…since the imposition of UN diamond sanctions against Unita, De Beers has – at 
some considerable cost to itself – gone much further than the legal requirements to 
ensure that the diamonds it sells are from conflict-free regions. 
 
At the same time De Beers shares the growing concern of the governments of 
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa that this issue presents a serious risk to the 
well regulated diamond industry which is so central to economic growth, 
employment and prosperity in these, the three most successful economies in 
Africa…the value of diamonds from all conflict areas (is) no more than 3.75 per 
cent of world production, whereas Botswana, Namibia and South Africa produce 
nearly half of world production by value. Responsible Western governments realise 
also that the orderly mining of diamonds under transparent and accountable 
democratic regimes must play an important role in the reconstruction of those 
African countries, such as Sierra Leone, so recently torn by conflict. The perpetual 
outlawing of their production, no matter how small, could deny them an important 
source of revenue…diamonds can play a role in that vital process of 
reconstruction.” 
 
The distinctive patterns of alliance have become quite apparent around the issue of 
conflict diamonds - African states like Botswana & Namibia as well as South 
Africa along with mining capital & organised labour concentrated in Southern 
Africa versus warlords & informal traders, certain transnational mineral 
entrepreneurs centred on Congo & Sierra Leone, even Kimberley versus Antwerp – 
with profound implications for policy & practice. 
 
At Kimberley, it was admitted that, until the May 2000 outbreak of renewed civil 
conflict in West Africa, the South African government had been encouraging De 
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Beers to return to Freetown as an aspect of reconstruction under the auspices of UN 
peacekeepers: the real international relations of conflict on the continent in the new 
century involving a diverse, changeable range of interests and actors. As in the 
recent case of transition in South Africa itself, any progress towards more 
acceptable, democratic, developmental regimes in countries like Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan etc have to be synchronised with the incremental lifting of a variety 
of state & non-state negative sanctions & institution of positive incentives 
(Crawford & Klotz 1999). 
 
In short, the real causes of and responses to conflict on the continent remain 
problematic at the turn of the century, in part because of outmoded analytic and 
policy assumptions and approaches and, in part, because of a growing diversity of 
real interests. Intra- & extra-continental, state and non-state responses to Africa’s 
continuing crises will necessitate a mixture of diplomacy and pressure, economics 
and politics, positive and negative sanctions etc if there is to be any prospect of a 
genuine African renaissance in the first decade of the new century. 
 
ix) The State of African IR/FP/IPE at Century’s Dawn 
“Africa presented two contradictory faces in 1999” (IISS 2000: 243). 
 
The actualities of African foreign policy/international relations/political economy 
are in great flux as both global & local contexts continue to evolve (Shaw & 
Nyang’oro 1999 & 2000). Yet analyses of them have not always kept pace with the 
actual shifts in the relationships among states, companies & civil societies (Wright 
1999). So, while the continent may indeed be Janus-faced as suggested above in the 
latest IISS Strategic Survey, the degree of contradictoriness may in part also be a 
function of inappropriate conceptual approaches. As Smillie et al (2000: 1) lament 
in regard to the state of the field(s), reflecting on their own pioneering & influential 
analysis of the case around Sierra Leone: 
 
“This study constitutes a strong critique of prevailing orthodox explanations of 
conflict, which tend towards state-centric & non-economic explanations. 
Traditional economics, in fact, as well as traditional political science & military 
history are of little assistance in explaining Sierra Leone’s conflict. The point of the 
war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in profitable crime under 
the cover of warfare.” 
 
Such interrelated deficiencies/possibilities are reflective of the range of ‘silences’ 
in the ten chapters on the continent crafted by Anglin (1999) for Conflicts in the 
World over the decade:  
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a) non-state actors, both NGOs/think-tanks & companies, from advocacy & 
delivery NGOs & development institutes like the NSI/ODC/ODI ‘alliance’ 
along with companies, especially those in energy & mining along with their 
vital security arrangements; 
 
b) new security threats such as small-arms/land-mines along with parallel ‘global’ 
as well as continental/local human security issues such as ecology (e.g. 
biodiversity), gangs, gender, viruses (e.g. AIDS) etc; 
 
c) diasporas, such as those active over Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc 
(including, for example, those in Canada able to exert pressure on Canadian 
state & non-state foreign policies); and  
 
d) post-conflict confidence-building measures/courts/enquiries/tribunals (cf South  
     Africa/Rwanda). 
 
Happily, however, any such deficiencies are about to be transcended as a couple of 
contemporary collections become available (Vale, Swatuk & Oden 2001, Dunn & 
Shaw 2001). Moreover, they lead towards a set of critical comments on the state of 
the interrelated ‘fields’ as outlined below – first, four interrelated ‘interdisciplinary’ 
fields & then another four somewhat more ‘disciplinary’ fields - again with 
implications for policy & practice as well as for analysis & theory. 
 
First, as indicated in the first paragraph of this paper, development studies/policies 
can no longer overlook awkward factors like the political economy of conflict, 
peace building & reconstruction. Rather, in the emerging post-neoliberal era, rather 
than concentrate on self-congratulatory comparisons about ‘external’ 
‘competitiveness’, they need to incorporate such inconvenient critiques of 
established policies which have failed to address underlying ‘internal’ social 
inequalities: onto emulation of UNDP’s (1999) not uncontroversial advocacy of a 
‘human security’ perspective: onto the real PE of child soldiers, private armies etc? 
 
Second, for security or strategic studies, this novel focus on the ‘real’ political 
economy of violence has profound implications, leading not only away from 
‘national’ towards ‘human’ security but also to analysis of novel issues & 
coalitions. Some of these are related to Africa’s current conflicts like AIDS, land-
mines & other small arms, migrations, ‘track-two’ diplomacy etc while others 
somewhat more distant, such as ecological sustainability, viruses, even post-
conflict redevelopment etc. 
 
 
 
 
26
Third, in such unenviable contexts, any discovery & advocacy of civil society 
groupings is to be encouraged given their exclusion even repression in the 
continent’s initial post-independence state socialist dispensation. They are 
important not only in terms of programme delivery but also in relation to advocacy; 
i.e. from human development to human security? 
 
And, finally, fourth in terms of the initial set of somewhat ‘interdisciplinary’ 
perspectives, as indicated in the preceding section, issues of governance among 
myriad non-state as well as state actors cannot be separated from questions of the 
causes & containment & resolution of conflicts: onto sustainable forms of ‘peace-
building governance’? 
 
And in terms of somewhat more established & unidisciplinary approaches, I turn 
first to that bastion of ‘realism’, hegemonic US versions of international 
politics/relations, which still focus on the state as the primary (only?!) legitimate or 
authoritative actor in global politics notwithstanding the undeniable roles of myriad 
non-state actors over multiple contemporary issues from AIDS to ecology, energy 
to gender. 
 
Second, the profoundly disturbing ‘emerging PE of violence’ perspective/paradigm 
also challenges discourses within the prevailing schools of international political 
economy which tend to assume that conflict is bad for business. Rather, it stands in 
stark contrast to prevailing debates about forms of globalisations & regionalisms, 
suggesting that some conflict is good for some businesses along with some leading 
actors in such sectors, whether informal as well as formal, illegal as well as legal.  
 
Third, such uncomfortable cases from the ‘periphery’ cannot be readily 
accommodated within orthodox political science, which would tend to treat them as 
aberrations. However, as the real world of conflict, civil societies, informal 
networks, illegalities etc becomes ever more apparent, so triangular forms of 
governance, which extend to regional as well as local & national levels of 
communication & negotiation, become undeniable even if theory has yet to fully 
embrace let alone explain.  
 
And finally, fourth, if the ‘discipline’ as a whole is in shock, then comparative 
politics in particular is in a condition of denial, while its relatively recent subfield 
of comparative transitions similarly cannot expand to embrace the real imperatives 
of many such changes! The former has yet to fully embrace the triad of central 
actor types already suggested while the latter has yet to adequately appreciate the 
prospects of regressions & worse, back to anarchies or authoritarianisms. 
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In short, as I’ve already suggested elsewhere (Shaw 1998), even before the PE of 
conflict genre became so familiar, the dynamics/ambiguities of the continent’s 
conflicts have served to challenge a variety of analytic & policy prescriptions, with 
implications for a range of assumptions/assertions, state & non-state actors etc 
alike. Hence the imperative of informed but modest new analytic suggestions or 
directions for the first decade of the new century at least, not just for African 
Studies but also for Development even Global Studies. And if security policies are 
thereby challenged so likewise should be development policies.  
 
So, if the PE of violence is in part a reaction to unacceptably low levels of 
BHN/HDI then, to have any chance of being efficacious, any peace-keeping 
intervention has to confront such contexts or causes; they cannot expect to be 
limited in either scale & time! In short, sustainable human development & 
sustainable human security are inseparable, particularly in the contemporary 
continent as it confronts such all too ubiquitous conflicts. If peace making is to lead 
towards peace building & on to reconstruction/reconciliation/redevelopment, then 
not just the symptoms but also the causes of such conflicts must be recognised & 
confronted. 
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